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Floating, and Hallucinating by
Scott C. Richmond. 232 pp.
Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2016. Paperback,
$27.00

In writing about the production
of cinema’s felt bodily illusions for
moving through space, Scott C.
Richmond sets himself the task of
describing what cinema does to
modulate human perception, how
we attune to cinema, and how
cinema operates above and below
the representational level, that is,
at the infrastructural and circuitous
sensate levels that bodies plug into
during a film encounter. The organizing investigation is into “the set
of perceptual processes whereby we
orient ourselves in and coordinate
ourselves with the world” named
proprioception, on which a selection
of films “thematize and roughen
our perceptual and, thus, embodied involvement with the world
unfolding before us onscreen” (6).
Richmond seizes on the paradoxical doubled body in proprioception
that involves the self in the world
and one’s reflexive self-perception
of that self. Polemically then,
Richmond seeks to invigorate
a “true phenomenology of perception” (69) for cinema studies
that refocuses its attention on the
viewer’s thickened, resonant, and
voluptuous experience of films by
rehabilitating the concept of proprioception via James J. Gibson,
Renaud Barbaras, and Maurice
Merleau-Ponty in conjunction with
aesthetics refashioned by Steven
Shaviro after Kant and Whitehead
(plus a late reading of Walter
Benjamin) to account for what
happens in the “technicity of the
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flesh” (a combination of Bernard
Stiegler and Mark Hanson)
during the coupling of viewer and
cinematic technics. In this regard
the book is a startling composition of theoretical frameworks
from psychology, media theory,
and continental philosophy that
enriches every field it engages but
most of all seems concerned with
advancing the philosophical purchase of cinema for rethinking
bodily being as partial, processual,
relational.
I enjoyed the challenge of reading with Richmond across highly
technical idioms to finesse new
understandings of “the illusion of
bodily movement through onscreen
space, or cinematic kinesthesis”
(18) by developing the central concepts of “proprioceptive aesthetics” (chapters 1 and 5), “ecological
phenomenology” (chapter 3), the
Epochē and the Écart (chapters 2
and 4), and “cinema as technics”
(chapter 6). But, for me, it was
Richmond’s tackling of the simple
idea that cinema presents an illusion
to its audience that accomplished
the difficult work of overturning
hegemonic perspectives in film
studies that adhere to philosophical
skepticism and modernist debates
on medium specificity. Typically
scholars are concerned with the
“illusion of reality” or the illusion
of moving images (58). “Illusions
that feel like illusions are not deceptive,” he writes (58). This is against
the field’s skeptical bias that would

assume cinema is a system for representing objects that fool the spectator into believing they actually
appear. Richmond insists that on
the nonrepresentational level, one’s
proprioceptive grasp of movement
abides even when one knows they
are not actually moving. Attending
to the illusion of flying sidelines
the problem of correspondence
onscreen and off that entangles
debates on film’s photographic realism, also in comparison with digital
technologies. Instead bodily illusions of proprioceptive movement
index “the always palpable divergence between ordinary perception
and its technical modulation by the
cinema” (70). I was convinced that
the overriding cinematic illusion
is the proprioceptive fun of being
“compelled, even captivated, by
the cinema’s aberrant information”
that I accept (however provisionally) due to what Merleau-Ponty
describes as the perceptual faith that
conditions my inherence in this
world, which is given to the world
onscreen and off (89).
The “I” that foregrounds his
spectatorial position leads the
reader into thick description of
select scenes and illusory effects in
Marcel Duchamp’s Anémic Cinéma
(1926), Tony Conrad’s The Flicker
(1965), Stanley Kubrick’s 2001:
A Space Odyssey (1968), Godfrey
Reggio’s Koyaanisqatsi (1982), and
Alfonso Cuarón’s Gravity (2013)
that together amass a range of periods, genres, and technical supports.

ON CINEMA’S BODILY ILLUSIONS
The chapters that center on these
filmic examples each offer an elaboration of what is at stake in the
deconstruction of dualist concepts
for embodiment such as the visible
and invisible with flesh, and of
the bodily ambivalences between
what’s onscreen and offscreen, real
or hallucinatory, or the spectatorial
position between active and passive. Hence, it struck me as somewhat odd that Richmond declines
the explicitly feminist standpoint
of Vivian Sobchack in The Address
of the Eye (1992) or the postcolonial critique of Laura U. Marks
in The Skin of the Film (1999). He
announces in the introduction that
“the phenomenological remit of
this book is to bracket its representational dimension—and thus
also to suspend most of our ways
of attending to the social, political, cultural, and ideological work
of the cinema,” which necessarily
involves “foregoing politics” until
the final sixth chapter in which
Walter Benjamin’s revampment
of media theory for the problems
of technological modernization
is brought into play (18). Despite
this said bracketing, I detect an
overarching political program that
would be integral to feminist and
postcolonial projects. In theorizing the more general and pervasive
way in which cinema modulates
a viewer’s body into experiencing
the perceptual sensations of flying, floating, and hallucinating,
Richmond foundationally takes it
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that cinema undercuts the notion
of bodily autonomy.
This is to say, the book stridently
takes on any overt or covert allegiance to an individual’s autonomy
in relation to technology, language,
and the world of representation/
art. The burden of the controlled,
separate individual who must communicate via “critical athleticism”
crops up in dominant frameworks
for aesthetics especially within
modernism. This kind of film critic
couches a skeptical subject who
properly differentiates an object
from its appearance and their body
from the world at large. In bolstering this posture, Richmond might
have expanded on feminist, transgender, and queer theory insights
and interventions within phenomenological body studies that our
bodies are not ours alone, nor are
we only our bodies (cf. Liz Grosz,
Jay Prosser, Judith Butler). The
problem of asserting bodily autonomy is—let me just say it—a problem of White European Colonizing
Man as Human, a sickly hangover
from Enlightenment thinking with
which Richmond himself quarrels. Indeed, the problem of bodily
autonomy is the lack thereof not
just for some subjects but for all
subjected to the false ideal therein.
Taking another tack, Cinema’s
Bodily Illusions quietly announces
a fun cinema whose tickling, sensitizing technicity in the flesh
teases the unbounded viewer—a
far cry from Baudry’s unitary and
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masterful viewer plugged into
the cinematic apparatus. I mean a
fun cinema in the many senses of
enjoyable, foolish, silly, humorous,
strange, odd, or causing perplexity
(terms that Richmond uses). The
book’s achievement of reintroducing amusement and wonder also
goes far in countering the negative
affects towards illusions, or even
towards the potentially damaging
element of cinematic technologies,
which underlie apparatus theories and stretch back to concerns
over stimulating optical toys and
spellbinding phantasmagoria. In
his realm of admittedly idiosyncratic film viewing, we encounter
this fun cinema as one of pleasure,
especially in submission; examples
include thin and anemic cinema
that give rise to cute experiences,
evanescent, and terrifying feelings,
and other giddy, funny, and weird
cinema that instantiates thrilling,
panic-inducing, meditative, slippery, and vertiginous moments.
Although Richmond focuses on
the how of cinematic coupling
with human perceptual systems,
rather than the why, clearly the

underlying assumption is that we
do so in whatever format because
they are inexplicably fun. The
book’s aim to explicate the workings of such fun aesthetics, in my
experience, adds to rather than
detracts from better understanding why “I delight in . . .” certain
cinematic affects. Cinema studies would do well to attend to
an outright laugh, a giggle, or to
taking pleasure in a “frankly psychedelic” effect or the yielding
to the training of proprioceptive
aesthetics. Richmond succeeds
best in presenting dramatized and
dedramatized scenes of cinephilia
predicated on a non-sovereign
body: “I am neither self-possessed
nor self-sufficient. I am open to
the world not only perceptually
but also technically” (17).
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